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Abstract
We examine the relationship between risk analysis and inequality analysis,
using a questionnaire-experimental approach .The experiments focus on the
eﬀect of income transformations on the perceived rankings of income distri-
butions in either a risk or inequality context. Both context and income levels
are important in inßuencing rankings.
Our thanks go to Stuart Birks, Rolf Cremer Wulf Gaertner and Jochen
Jungeilges who assisted in running the questionnaires. This paper
forms part of the research programme of the TMR network Living Stan-
dards, Inequality and Taxation [Contract No. ERBFMRXCT 980248]
of the European Communities whose Þnancial support is gratefully ac-
knowleged.
1 Introduction
The literature on the ranking of probability distributions forms one of the
most important intellectual sources of the modern inequality literature. Some
of the seminal pieces in inequality analysis started from the insight that the
problem of ordering income distributions in terms of inequality is essentially
similar to the problem of ordering distributions in other contexts. Further-
more, some economists and philosophers have suggested a formal basis for
social attitudes to inequality using individual attitudes to uncertainty. How-
ever, persuasive as those approaches may be to students of the formal of
analysis of distributional comparisons, they are just based on one particular
intellectual rationale for a welfare-economic approach to income distribution.
It may be that, in practice, peoples perceptions of inequality and of risk are
based on quite diﬀerent intellectual premises or that they Þnd expression in
diﬀerent distributional rankings. In this paper we shed some light on this
issue by examining experimental evidence of individual rankings in the com-
parison of risky situations and comparing these results with an identically
structured experiment involving inequality.
Section 2 examines the theoretical roots of the risk-inequality analysis
and the issues to be examined; sections 4 and 5 respectively describe the
experiment and the results (details are in the Appendix); section 6 concludes.
2 Inequality and Risk
2.1 Points of comparison
If one were to pose the question Is there a relationship between inequality
measures and measures of risk? then there would appear to be an immediate
answer. Inequality measures such as the coeﬃcient of variation and the
variance of logarithms have obvious counterparts in the analysis of risk, since
the standard deviation or variance is conventionally used as the measure
of spread, either for income or its logarithm. The entropy measures of
Theil (1967) have their roots in the economics of information and there is
also a case for considering the generalised entropy concepts as a measure of
risk.1 However to focus solely the parallelism of approach between these two
1Note that much of the argument could be conducted with a weaker representation of
attitudes to risk or inequality. For example one could discuss risk rankings rather than risk
measures, inequality rankings rather than inequality measures. However, even with this
weaker approach some diﬃculties remain. For example there is the issue of reversability. If
it were found that for speciÞc across-the-board income increases would reduce risk would
it also true to say that under the corresponding reductions in incomes across the board
1
aspects of distributional analysis would be to omit three important issues for
consideration.
1. The special interest of risk-analysis here is not just that one can Þnd
useful and suggestive parallels between the analysis of income distribu-
tion and the analysis of risk  as one can also with, say, the distribution
of Þrms by size or the geographical dispersion of rainfall. On a priori
grounds one can argue that the analysis of probability distributions
may be an appropriate basis for the analysis of income distributions.
2. Second, there are other aspects of the risk-inequality relationship where
the intellectual connection is less immediate than in the case of in-
equality measures and measures of risk. For example in the inequality
literature there is an implied relationship between social welfare (W )
and inequality (I)
W = φ(I, µ) (1)
where µ is mean income: (1) may be used to map an inequality or-
dering into a welfare ordering and vice versa.2. Of course (1) has a
counterpart in the special representation of investors utility as a func-
tion of variance and the mean3, but one might wonder whether there is
in general an appropriate equivalent of (1) in the case of risk analysis
and, if so, whether it can be used as a basis for establishing a formal
link between inequality and risk rankings.
3. Perhaps more importantly, some researchers take the view that, rather
than risk orderings being just an appropriate basis for comparison with
inequality counterparts (as in point 1 above) they are the essential
foundation for the axiomatisation of inequality comparisons. In some
instances the argument linking the two would also invoke an explicit
welfare-theoretic link as in point 2.4
To investigate further the potential links between the two Þelds let us
consider some of the theoretical and practical diﬃculties that have to be
addressed in order to give meaning to the comparative analysis of inequality
and risk orderings.
risk will increase? We prefer to keep this question open for the present paper, although
the conceptual and logical diﬃculties associated with it should not be understated.
2The exact nature of the function φ will depend upon the cardinalisation of the inequal-
ity index and the welfare function. However this technicality is not of special signiÞcance
here.
3See, for example Hirshleifer (1970), chapter 10.
4See for example Harsanyi (1955).
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2.2 Some diﬃculties
2.2.1 The nature of income and wealth
Some of the routine concerns about the deÞnition of income or of wealth that
arise in the context of applied social welfare analysis  such as the compre-
hensiveness of the deÞnition and whether it is received by individual persons
or households  will also apply to the comparison of income distributions in
terms of risk. Here we will assume that income and income-recipient are un-
ambiguously deÞned concepts. This sweeps aside all but one consideration
concerning the nature of income and wealth; the remaining consideration
arises in a major area of diﬃculty  the deÞnition of the risk concept.
2.2.2 The deÞnition of risk
Risk in the abstract is a concept that is somewhat elusive. Standard references
fall back on either generalised descriptions such as risk reßects the variability
of future returns from a capital investment (Pass et al. 1993) or enumeration
of possible interpretations  Yates (1992) lists ten diﬀerent deÞnitions of risk
on page 1.5 Its relationship with the size of incomes involved is also unclear
a priori.6. It is easy to concur with the view that People disagree more
about what risk is than about how large it is.(Fischhoﬀ 1985)
However, one special connotation of the word risk is worth special men-
tion: in many cases the concept is associated principally with the possibility
of loss. (Yates 1992, page 17). Unlike the standard theory of distributional
ordering in the welfare-theoretic analysis of income distribution risk analysis
is usually carried out relative to speciÞc initial wealth level. This is the
one point where the deÞnition of income or wealth has a signiÞcance be-
yond the routine practicalities noted in 2.2.1. There an analogy here with
Temkins (1986,1993) alternative philosophical approach to the foundations
of inequality analysis. In Temkins approach inequalities are deÞned in terms
of complaints felt by individuals relative to a speciÞed reference income
level. These issues will turn out to be of special relevance to the experimen-
tal analysis discussed below.
5Cf the nine diﬀerent concepts of inequality listed in Rein and Miller (1974).
6Risk should not, however, be confused with probability since it is an amalgam of
both this probability and the size of the event. If the 1 in 10 chance of a loss is one of
making a very big loss indeed, this can be a more risky event than one where the probable
gains are exactly the same, but the risk of loss is much smaller. (Pearce 1983) page 287.
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2.2.3 Risk and preferences
Now consider the issue raised above  the risk-counterpart to (1). The prin-
cipal example of this relationship is the use of mean-variance analysis: this
incorporates both a natural measure of risk and a simple preference structure,
but of course this relies on the use of a speciÞc, and perhaps questionable,
utility function. By contrast comparatively little use is made of the more
general counterpart to the Lorenz-curve approach as a means of characteris-
ing risk, although clearly one could build a Lorenz curve for risk upon the
equivalent of the axioms used in inequality analysis (Cf Laﬀont 1989, page
27). However, this itself begs two questions
1. Whether the inequality axioms are themselves appropriate.
2. The nature of the relationship φ in (1).
A conventional microeconomic argument might suggest that these ambi-
guities could be disposed of by invoking the standard stochastic dominance
approach (Hadar and Russell 1969) . If one is prepared to apply the criterion
of second-order dominance to a set of distributions F one can clearly derive
the Lorenz order for any subset F(µ) of F in which all the distributions have
the same mean µ. However, stochastic dominance is not principally about
the nature of risk per se but about the structure of preferences under uncer-
tainty.
The argument for the stochastic dominance approach encounters a further
diﬃculty. In the literature on inequality and social welfare it is sometimes
argued that the chain of connection from W to I introduces overly strong a
priori assumptions. A similar claim may be made in the case of the analysis
of preferences under uncertainty. There is a good case for arguing that the
von-Neumann-Morgenstern formulation of preference structures does not ad-
equately capture peoples rankings of uncertain prospects. It should be recog-
nised that, even if peoples preferences violate the von-Neumann-Morgenstern
assumptions, they may yet have a coherent perception of risk.7 There are
several strands to the argument:
 It is not clear that people think in terms of preferences over prospects
as the standard theory suggests.
 If people do have well-deÞned preference orderings over prospects, it is
not clear that their attitudes to uncertainty can be well represented by
a utility function that conforms to the standard axioms.
7Cf the discussion by Laﬀont (1989) of alternative axiomatisations of preferences.
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 There may be a confusion between better-than relationships and pure
risk comparisons. However, it should be noted that in the correspond-
ing discussion of inequality this confusion does not usually arise.
 People may or may not be risk-averse in the sense of disliking mean-
preserving spreads.
A comprehensive study that successfully disentangled the concept of risk
per se from the language of preference would clearly be demanding. For this
reason we seek an alternative approach.
3 An Alternative Approach
The preference approach to the topic would take either a speciÞc W (welfare
or utility) on the left-hand side of (1) and infer a speciÞc risk or inequality
ordering or a class of such W -indices and, from the properties of that class,
infer the corresponding properties of a class of risk or inequality orderings.
As we have argued, the formal apparatus required to adopt this approach
may be too demanding. It is appropriate to consider whether useful insights
may be obtained by reversing the chain of thought in order to tackle the issue
of risk orderings directly, rather than through the preference approach.
In previous contributions we have argued the case for thinking about
inequality in a way that leaves open the question of whether the basic
axioms are to be adopted or not.8 What would emerge if one were to adopt
the same kind of approach to an examination of the problem of comparing
risky prospects?
3.1 Axioms: a brief overview
In principle a questionnaire approach could be adapted from questionnaires
on inequality or social welfare; the second, indirect route would then make use
of the type of relationship encapsulated in (1). The two types of questionnaire
lead to diﬀerent concepts in the analysis of individual preference orderings in
the face of uncertainty. The inequality questions can be made to correspond
to the concept of risk; on the other hand questions on social welfare rankings
can be shown to be parallel to the questions on individual preference rankings
of prospects.9 Table 1 provides a brief comparative summary across the Þelds.
Alternative commonly used distributional tools can be derived by selecting
8See for example Amiel and Cowell (1992)
9On risk and inequality see Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970, 1971, 1973), Nermuth (1993).
On distributional rankings and Þrst- and second-order concepts of dominance see for ex-
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Inequality Risk Social Preferences
Welfare over Prospects
1 Anonymity
√ √ √ √
2 Monotonicity
√ √
3 Transfer
√ √ √ √
4 Population
√ √ √ √
5 Decomposability
√ √ √ √
6 Scale independence
√ √
* *
7 Translation independence
√ √
* *
* In the case of social welfare and preference over prospects neither form of the
independence axiom makes much sense, but scale- or translation-invariance
(homotheticity to the origin or to negatve inÞnity) may make be relevant.
Table 1: Standard axioms in the analysis of income and probability distri-
butions
diﬀerent combinations of standard axioms from the list: for example, for the
regular Lorenz curve one invokes Axioms 1,3,4 and 5. Some of the more
recondite points in the two subject areas can also be related: for example
the issue of violations of the independence axiom in the analysis of risk,10
and the issue of externalities in the assessment of income distributions.
3.2 Experimental foundation
There is of course a substantial literature on the experimental approach to
peoples behaviour in situations of choice under risk and some well-known
counterparts to the unconventional results that we have found from our own
questionnaire experiments.11 However to carry through an eﬀective compari-
son of perceptions in the two Þelds it is more useful to mimic the approach to
income distribution by constructing a questionnaire-experiment in the Þeld
of perceptions of risk and uncertainty of the same format. To that end we
shall build upon the approach in Amiel and Cowell (1999a)  see section 4.
We have not attempted a comprehensive investigation of each of the ax-
ioms listed in Table 1. In this paper we concentrate just on issues arising
ample Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982), Saposnik (1981, 1983), Kolm (1969), Marshall
and Olkin (1979), Shorrocks (1983). For higher-order concepts of dominance see Davies
and Hoy (1995), Fishburn and Willig (1984), Kolm (1974, 1976), Shorrocks and Foster
(1987),
10This is manifested in the phenomenon of regrets in choice under uncertainty.
11Perhaps one of the best known of these is the Allais paradox  Allais (1953), Allais
and Hagen (1979), Dre`ze (1974), Raiﬀa (1968).
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from axioms 6 and 7 in order to focus upon the relationships between changes
in overall income levels and perceptions of risk. Issues raised by the other
principles are examined elsewhere.12
3.3 Risk maps
In order to characterise key aspects of risk orderings it is useful to think of
iso-risk contours in the space of income distributions, which is taken to be
the set of all non-negative income vectors excluding the zero vector. Again it
should be emphasised that this is a separate construct from the conventional
approach where one examines preferences in a state space diagram. To Þx
ideas, three special cases where the risk map is homothetic to a point in R2
are illustrated in Figure 1, where the axes measure the incomes xi under two
of the possible states of the world. If each state of the world corresponds to
the identity of one population member then the axes can also be thought of
measuring the incomes of two individuals from the population. Clearly the
45◦ line denotes zero risk and the contours further from the line correspond
to progressively higher risk levels. In panel (a) uniform absolute additions
to all incomes in the distribution would leave risk unchanged; in (c) uniform
proportionate additions to all incomes would leave risk unchanged; panel
(b) represents an intermediate case of a homothetic ranking where equal
absolute additions to all incomes are perceived as reducing risk, but uniform
proportionate additions to all incomes are perceived as increasing risk.13
However, these are only convenient constructs, and there is no special
reason to suppose that any of the three patterns is theoretically appropriate
on a priori grounds. For example, in the context of income inequality, Dalton
argued that proportionate increases in income should lead to lower contours14
12The issue of the transfer principle is discussed in Amiel and Cowell (2001).
13The choice between relativism and absolutism could be resolved in several of ways.
For example one might consider a speciÞc compromise transformation types t such that
0 < t < 1. Cf Kolm (1976) and Bossert and PÞngsten (1990) in the context of inequality.
14we have [...] the principle of the proportional additions to incomes. It is sometimes
suggested that proportionate additions to, or subtractions from, all incomes will leave in-
equality unaﬀected. But [... it] appears rather that proportionate additions to all incomes
will decrease inequality and that proportionate subtractions increase it.  Dalton (1920),
p355. Note that if this principle is to be adopted and the space of income distributions
includes all positive income vectors it is logically impossible to have homothetic contours.
The reason for this is that a homothetic set of contours with the property that uniform
proportionate additions to incomes reduces risk must be homothetic to a point (a, a, ..., a)
on the 45◦ ray where a > 0.  the contours fan out more sharply than in Figure 1 (c).
But this would mean that a prospect consisting of the positive income level a received with
certainty would be regarded as zero risk and any arbitrary positive level of risk. Hence
the sketch of the Dalton principle in Figure 2.
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x1
x2
x1
x2
(c)(b)
x1
x2
(a)
Figure 1: Iso-risk contours in the case of (a) translation independence (b)
the intermediate case, and (c) scale independence
 for example as illustrated in Figure 2.
Furthermore it is not clear that any one speciÞc pattern of contours cor-
responds to peoples views on distributional orderings in terms of risk. For
this reason we used a questionnaire-experimental technique to investigate the
issue, a technique that has already been applied in the case of inequality and
income transformations. The key questions to be addressed are, clearly, what
is the appropriate shape of the risk-contour map and is it similar to that of
the corresponding inequality-contour map?
4 The Experiments
4.1 The Questionnaire Structure
To investigate the issue of structure we used a questionnaire experiment that
was formulated according the general pattern outlined in Amiel and Cowell
(1999b). Groups of students were invited to Þll out the questionnaire illus-
trated in Figures 3 and 4 in the Appendix. The questionnaire combines a set
of numerical problems and a linked verbal question. The numerical problems
(Figure 3) are set within the context of a mythical Alfaland: the reference
income level is indicated by giving the average income in Alfaland as a whole
and a poverty-line income. Respondents are told that there are marked dif-
ferences in income levels between two of the constituent regions (A and B) of
Alfaland, and within each region there is an equal number of rich and poor.
There is assumed to be individual income risk for a potential migrant to
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x1
x2
Figure 2: The Dalton principle of proportional additions to incomes
either region  such a person would have a 50-50 chance of belonging to the
poor or the rich group. Respondents are invited to compare the individual
income risk of regions A and B for diﬀerent values of the (poor,rich)-income
distribution on a purely ordinal basis. The numerical questions include cases
where the implied additions to income are equal in absolute terms, where
they are equi-proportional and intermediate cases; they also cover cases of
low, medium and high incomes (relative to the reference incomes in Alfa-
land). The second part of the questionnaire-experiment (Figure 4) is mainly
a verbal question that focuses on the same issues as the numerical problems;
Þnally respondents are asked whether they wish to change their responses on
the numerical part now that the issue has been explained to them in words.
For comparison the corresponding inequality questionnaire is also given
in the Appendix  see Figures 5 and 6.
4.2 Running the experiment
The experimental sessions were run formally during class or lecture time
so that a high rate of participation was ensured. The underlying economic
theory was not explained to them beforehand.
In separate experimental sessions a combined group of 346 students com-
pleted the risk questionnaire: two groups at the LSE (N = 41 and 62), two
at the Ruppin Institute (N = 38 and 85), and one group each at Massey
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University, New Zealand (N = 27) and one group at Universita¨t Osnabru¨ck
(N = 93). The method was identical in structure to the experiment con-
ducted on income-inequality rankings (N = 236  for further details see
Amiel and Cowell 1999b) which will be used as a basis for comparison later
in this paper.
5 The Results
5.1 Overview
The overview of results on the numerical questions (top part of Table 2)
is arranged so that one can easily compare the results of making diﬀerent
types of income change at various income levels with reference to the three
simpliÞed patterns illustrated in Figure 1. For example, in part (a) a person
whose risk perceptions were represented by the contours in part (a) of Figure
1 would respond Same at all three income levels represented by questions
1, 4 and 7, while a person with perceptions conforming to patterns (b) or (c)
would respond Down.
It is clear that, whether the question implied uniform absolute or uniform
proportional additions, or something in between the dominant response is
that the implied income change in going from distribution A to distribution
B implies a reduction in risk. A sharper interpretation may be drawn. Note
that triples of questions (q1-q3 etc.) can be used to determine whether, at
each income level, responses are consistent with one of the standard patterns
of contours illustrated in Figures 1 and 2  for example someone whose
views on the relationship between risk and income levels were strictly scale-
independent would respond Down, Down, Same to all three triples
of questions.15 The results of this interpretation are shown in Table 3 from
which it is evident that, with the exception of income changes at high income
levels, the responses consistent with the Dalton pattern dominate. Of course
it is possible that in each of the triples individuals could answer in a fashion
15Using the symbols D, U and S to correspond to the labels Down, Up and Same
for each set of responses (questions 1-3, questions 4-6, questions 7-9) in Table 3 the cate-
gorisation into the Þve possible cases is as follows
Translation-indep SUU
Intermediate DDU,DSU,DUU
Scale-indep DDS
Dalton DDD
Other other D-U-S combinations
Note that Other covers the Anti-Dalton case and cases where responses were in-
consistent.
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Down Up Same
(a) Adding a Þxed absolute sum
q1 A = (200,400) B = (400,600) 77% 9% 14%
q4 A = (600,900) B = (900,1200) 65% 11% 24%
q7 A = (1200,1800) B = (1800,2400) 53% 17% 29%
(b) Adding a compromise sum (between absolute and prop.)
q2 A = (200,400) B = (400,700) 77% 17% 5%
q5 A = (600,900) B = (900,1300) 61% 29% 9%
q8 A = (1200,1800) B = (1800, 2550) 53% 34% 12%
(c) Adding a Þxed proportionate sum
q3 A = (200,400) B = (400,800) 70% 18% 12%
q6 A = (600,900) B = (900,1350) 55% 32% 12%
q9 A = (1200,1800) B = (1800,2700) 43% 38% 18%
q10: What income change will leave risk unchanged?
proportionate additions 19%
Þxed sum 13%
depends on levels 45%
none of these 14%
For questions 1-9, N=346, for question 10, N=253
Table 2: Responses to numerical questions on risk
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low income medium income high income
(q1-q3) (q4-q6) (q7-q9)
Translation-indep 6.6% 11.3% 11.6%
Intermediate 4.3% 13.0% 10.1%
Scale-indep 5.5% 4.6% 4.9%
Dalton 64.2% 44.5% 36.1%
Other 19.4% 26.6% 37.3%
Table 3: Structure of responses to numerical question on risk
that was mathematically inconsistent: about 12 percent responded in this
way and these are included in the Others category of Table 3.
The responses to the verbal question are summarised in the lower part of
Table 2. They show that the response Whether the riskiness of the lottery
remains unaltered depends not only on the changes but also on initial and
Þnal levels of the payoﬀs commands as much support as any of the other
responses combined (9% of the sample did not respond to this question).
Finally, as with similar previous studies we found that very few individuals
wanted to change their responses.
5.2 Breakdown by University
The details of the responses to the numerical questions are given in Table
7 in the Appendix where the dominant responses for each group on each
question have been highlighted in bold. It is clear that at low income lev-
els (where the income distributions cluster around Alfalands hypothetical
poverty line) there is virtually unanimous agreement in the Down-Up-
Same responses across all the university subgroups. At higher income
levels the unanimity is less clear-cut  students in one of the LSE groups and
at Massey University sometimes reported that if the income increase were
uniform proportional or an amount between proportional and absolute, this
transformation would increase rather than reduce risk.
The responses to the verbal question are in Table 4. Again the results
are consistent across the diﬀerent subsamples  there is the same ordering of
results across the four possible responses (c-a-b-d), with the one exception.
This exception involves the same LSE group as noted in the discussion of
the numerical questions and it is interesting to note that it and Massey
both record especially high support for answer (d), depends on levels; in
other words the verbal responses for these two groups match the way they
responded to the numerical problems.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
proportional Þxed depends on none of
N additions sum levels these
LSE 1 41 15% 7% 54% 5%
LSE 2 62 19% 5% 45% 23%
Massey 27 15% 15% 56% 4%
Ruppin 1 38 29% 16% 39% 13%
Ruppin 2 85 19% 19% 40% 15%
All 253 19% 13% 45% 14%
N.B. Results of Osnabru¨ck University are unavailable
Table 4: Responses to verbal question on risk
q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 q6 q7 q8 q9
Inequality
Response A 78% 68% 40% 55% 40% 24% 51% 41% 16%
Response A&B 11% 3% 28% 23% 6% 22% 24% 5% 24%
Response B 10% 28% 29% 18% 52% 53% 24% 52% 59%
Risk
Response A 77% 77% 70% 65% 61% 55% 53% 53% 43%
Response A&B 14% 5% 12% 24% 9% 12% 29% 12% 18%
Response B 9% 17% 18% 11% 29% 32% 17% 34% 38%
prob 0.4276 0.0078 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.2125 0.0002 0.0000
Table 5: Comparison of risk and inequality
5.3 Comparison of risk with inequality
Now return to the question that was raised in section 3.3: the relationship
between the maps of inequality and risk orderings.
The key comparison is illustrated in Table 5 that presents the results on
a question-by-question basis. Response A means that individuals circled
A on the questionnaire sheet and would be consistent with a view that the
implied income transformation A→B reduces inequality or risk respectively.
It is clear that individuals did usually respond A in both contexts. How-
ever, the Þnal row of Table 5 gives the probability values for a χ2-test taking
each numerical question separately: it is clear that with the exception of the
Þrst and seventh questions (the cases where a Þxed sum is added at low and
13
proportional Þxed depends None of
additions sum on levels these
Inequality N =186 32% 11% 41% 9%
Risk N =235 19% 13% 45% 14%
Prob 0.03237
Table 6: What income change will leave inequality or risk unchanged?
high incomes respectively) we must reject the hypothesis that the risk and
inequality responses have the same distribution. The responses to the verbal
question reveal a similar story as Table 6 shows.
6 Conclusions
There is no single deÞnition of risk that commands wide acceptance a priori
and, therefore, no standard theory of how risk is associated with changes in
the income distribution. Stochastic dominance analysis and its associated
constructs focus upon preference under uncertainty rather than isolating a
pure concept of risk per se. A Lorenz-style ranking approach would leave
open the question of the relationship between income transformations of a
distribution and its associated risk.
Our questionnaire approach provides some insight on the perceived nature
of tis relationship. It turns out that the iso-risk map is markedly diﬀerent
from the iso-inequality map. However in both cases individuals rankings
conform to a pattern that is consistent with Daltons principle of proportional
additions to incomes  overwhelmingly so in the case of risk  and the results
are fairly consistent across the subgroups drawn from diﬀerent countries
universities.
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Appendix
q1 q4 q7
(a) A = (200,400),B = (400,600) A = (600,900),B = (900,1200) A = (1200,1800),B = (1800,2400)
N Down Up Same Down Up Same Down Up Same
LSE 1 41 71% 10% 19% 61% 7% 32% 46% 32% 20%
LSE 2 62 81% 10% 10% 61% 8% 31% 60% 6% 34%
Massey 27 74% 7% 19% 41% 22% 37% 41% 26% 33%
Osnabruck 93 86% 5% 9% 80% 6% 14% 56% 15% 27%
Ruppin 1 38 79% 0% 21% 68% 11% 21% 58% 16% 26%
Ruppin 2 85 68% 18% 14% 60% 15% 25% 49% 19% 31%
All 346 77% 9% 14% 65% 11% 24% 53% 17% 29%
q2 q5 q8
(b) A = (200,400),B = (400,700) A = (600,900),B = (900,1300) A = (1200,1800),B = (1800, 2550)
N Down Up Same Down Up Same Down Up Same
LSE 1 41 63% 27% 10% 42% 51% 5% 42% 54% 2%
LSE 2 62 84% 16% 0% 66% 23% 11% 61% 21% 18%
Massey 27 67% 30% 4% 48% 44% 7% 48% 44% 7%
Osnabru¨u¨ck 93 84% 9% 8% 72% 18% 9% 49% 34% 15%
Ruppin 1 38 79% 8% 13% 61% 32% 8% 55% 32% 13%
Ruppin 2 85 73% 24% 2% 60% 28% 12% 59% 31% 11%
All 346 77% 17% 5% 61% 29% 9% 53% 34% 12%
q3 q6 q9
(c) :A = (200,400),B = (400,800) A = (600,900)B = (900,1350) A = (1200,1800)B = (1800,2700)
N Down Up Same Down Up Same Down Up Same
LSE 1 41 39% 39% 22% 32% 54% 12% 24% 59% 15%
LSE 2 62 71% 11% 18% 61% 21% 18% 50% 21% 29%
Massey 27 70% 22% 7% 44% 52% 4% 26% 59% 15%
Osnabru¨ck 93 81% 10% 10% 61% 29% 10% 45% 34% 19%
Ruppin 1 38 76% 8% 16% 58% 29% 13% 47% 34% 16%
Ruppin 2 85 68% 25% 7% 58% 28% 14% 49% 38% 12%
All 346 70% 18% 12% 55% 32% 12% 43% 38% 18%
Table 7: Resposes to numerical questions : detail by individual subsamples
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 INCOME RISK QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
This questionnaire concerns people's attitude to risk.   We would be interested in your view, based on
hypothetical situations. Because it is about attitudes there are no "right" answers. Some of the possible
answers correspond to assumptions commonly made by economists: but these assumptions may not be
good ones.  Your responses will help to shed some light on this, and we would like to thank you for your
participation. The questionnaire is anonymous.  Please do not write your name on it. 
 
In Alfaland there are areas with different levels of income. All areas have 
the same number of people who are identical in every respect except their 
incomes: in each area half of the people have a relatively low income and 
the other half have a relatively high income. The income of a migrant 
into any area would effectively be determined by a lottery: the person 
would get the higher or the lower income of that area with probability 
50%. The average income in Alfaland in terms of local currency is 1000 
Alfa-dollars and the income that ensures a supply of basic needs is 400 
Alfa-dollars. 
 In each of the following questions you are asked to compare two 
distributions of income, one per area.  Please state which of the two you 
consider to be more risky to a potential migrant by circling A or B. If you 
consider that the distributions exhibit the same risk then circle both A 
and B. 
 
 
1)  A = (200, 400)    B = (400, 600) 
2)  A = (200, 400)    B = (400, 700) 
3)  A = (200, 400)    B = (400, 800) 
 
4)  A = (600, 900)    B = (900, 1200) 
5)  A = (600, 900)    B = (900, 1300) 
6)  A = (600, 900)    B = (900, 1350) 
 
7)  A = (1200, 1800)   B = (1800, 2400) 
8)  A = (1200, 1800)   B = (1800, 2550) 
9)  A = (1200, 1800)   B = (1800, 2700) 
Figure 3: The risk questionnaire: numerical part
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In the next question you are presented with possible views about risk-
comparisons labelled a,b,c,d.  Please circle the letter alongside the view that 
corresponds most closely to your own. Feel free to add any comments to explain 
the reason for your choice. 
 
 
10)  Suppose we change all the payoffs in a lottery simultaneously: 
 
 
a) If we add to (or deduct from) each payoff an amount that is 
proportional to the original payoff then the riskiness of the lottery 
remains unchanged. 
 
b) If we add to (or deduct from) each original payoff the same fixed 
amount then the riskiness of the lottery remains unchanged. 
 
c) Whether the riskiness of the lottery remains unaltered depends 
not only on the changes but also on initial and final levels of the 
payoffs 
 
d) None of the above. 
 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answers to questions 1-9?  If so, please
note your new responses here: 
 
 
1)      6) 
 
2)      7) 
 
3)      8) 
 
4)      9) 
 
5) 
Figure 4: The risk questionnaire: verbal part
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 INCOME INEQUALITY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
This questionnaire concerns people's attitude to income inequality.   We would be interested in your view,
based on hypothetical situations. Because it is about attitudes there are no "right" answers. Some of the
possible answers correspond to assumptions consciously made by economists:  but these assumptions may
not be good ones.   Your responses will help to shed some light on this, and we would like to thank you for
your participation. The questionnaire is anonymous.  Please do not write your name on it. 
 
In Alfaland there are areas with different levels of income. All areas have 
the same number of people which are identical except in their incomes. 
In each area half of the people have one level of income and the other 
half have another level of income. The average income in Alfaland in 
terms of local currency is 1000 Alfa-dollars and the income which 
ensures a supply of basic needs is 400 Alfa-dollars. 
 In each of the following questions you are asked to compare two 
distributions of income - one per area.   Please state which of them you 
consider to be the more unequally distributed by circling A or B. If you 
consider that both of the distributions have the same inequality then 
circle both A and B. 
 
 
1)  A = (200, 400)    B = (400, 600) 
2)  A = (200, 400)    B = (400, 700) 
3)  A = (200, 400)    B = (400, 800) 
 
4)  A = (600, 900)    B = (900, 1200) 
5)  A = (600, 900)    B = (900, 1300) 
6)  A = (600, 900)    B = (900, 1350) 
 
7)  A = (1200, 1800)   B = (1800, 2400) 
8)  A = (1200, 1800)   B = (1800, 2550) 
9)  A = (1200, 1800)   B = (1800, 2700) 
Figure 5: The inequality questionnaire: numerical part
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In the next question you are presented with possible views about 
inequality comparisons labelled a,b,c,d.  Please circle the letter alongside 
the view that corresponds most closely to your own. Feel free to add any 
comments which explain the reason for your choice. 
 
 
10)  Suppose we change the real income of each person in a society, when not all the
initial incomes are equal. 
 
 
a) If we add (or deduct) an amount to the income of each person that is 
proportional to his initial income then inequality remains unaltered. 
 
b) If we add (or deduct) the same fixed amount to the incomes of each 
person inequality remains unaltered. 
 
c) Inequality may remain unaltered: whether it does so depends not only 
on the change but also on initial and final levels of real income. 
 
d) None of the above. 
 
 
In the light of the above would you want to change your answers to questions 1-9?  If so,
please note your new responses here: 
 
 
1)      6) 
 
2)      7) 
 
3)      8) 
 
4)      9) 
 
5 
Figure 6: The risk questionnaire: verbal part
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